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.THACKER v. HARDY.
The defendant employed the plaintiff, a stockbroker, to speculate for him on the
stock exchange, knowing that for the purpose of carrying out his transactions the
plaintiff would have to enter into contracts to buy or sell stocks and shares, and,
in order to protect himself and the defendant, would have to enter into other contracts to buy or sell respectively. The plaintiff knew that the defendant never
expected or intended to accept actual delivery of the stocks and shares which the
plaintiff might buy for him, nor actually to deliver the stocks and shares that the
plaintiff might sell for him. The defendant, nevertheless, knew that he incurred
the risk of having to accept or deliver; but was content to run that risk in the
expectation and hope. that the plaintiff would arrange so as to make nothing but
"differences" payable to or by him; and unless that arrangement was made the
defendant was, to the knowledge of the plaintiff, wholly unable to pay for or
deliver the stocks and shares bought or sold.
In an action by the plaintiff against the defendant for commission and indemnity against the liabilities incurred by the plaintiff on the stock exchange, with the
authority and for the benefit of the defendant, the defendant pleaded that the claim
was founded on gaming and wagering transactions, illegal at common law and
under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
both the commission and indemnity claimed.
Griizeoodv. Blane, 11 C. B. 538, discussed.

THIS was an appeal from a judgment of LrND:ff, J., at a trial
without a jury, and raised the question of the right of a stockbroker to recover from his employer, commission and money paid
for differences arising in transactions on the stock exchange, in
which, to the knowledge of the broker, no actual transfer of stock
was intended to be made.
The plaintiff was a stockbroker, and the defendant a gentleman
possessed of about 20,0001. At the time of the transactions, out
of which the present action arose, the defendant shared the plaintiff's offices, and employed his capital in gambling transactions, ill
which the plaintiff acted for him as broker, employing a jobber in
the usual way. The action was for a sum of 18,4141. 178. 6d.,
due from the defendant to the plaintiff, on account of a long series
of sales of stocks and shares, and of carrying over and closing
various contracts and sales, and for commission on the several
transactions. The main defence set up by the defendant was that
the contracts in respect of which the plaintiff claimed were made
by way of wagering, and were therefore void and illegal.
The judge gave judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount
claimed, with costs, whereupon defendant appealed.
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Mackenzie, for defendant.
MJntyre,

Q. C., and Payne, for plaintiff, were not called upon.

am of opinion that this judgment must be
BRAmwELL, L. J.-I
affirmed. The question is not what was the bargain between the
jobber in the house and the defendant (the principal), through the
intervention of a broker, but between the broker and the principal.
It was admitted that these bargains are what they purport to be,
bargains which gave the jobber a right to call upon the broker or
principal to take the stock, and the broker a right to call upon the
jobber to deliver, there was nothing in the dealing between
the jobber and the broker, on behalf of the principal, by which the
jobber could tell whether the transaction was one for an investment
for the principal or for a speculation; and accordingly, Mr. Mackenzie does not rely on the bargain between the broker and the
jobber being a gambling or wagering transaction. If the fact had
been, as it was supposed erroneously in Grizewood v. Blane,
(perhaps rightly enough on the evidence as it was understood),
the judgment in that case would be quite right, but it was not so;
all these bargains between the man in the house and the broker
are real bargains, and mean what they say, though, very probably,
when the time comes for their fulfilment another bargain may be
made in lieu of the original one. Mr. Mackenzie admits this, but
puts a new matter before us. He siys, assuming it to be true that
the jobber or dealer in the house could enforce an exact perform.ance of the contracts, yet that the bargain between the plaintiff,
whois suing, and who was the broker and not the jobber, and the
defendant, was that, "though you, the broker, are to buy for me or
sell for me, I am never to pay for the article bought, or take or
deliver it and receive or pay the price accordingly, but you are,
when the time arrives for my taking or paying the price, or delivering or receiving the article, to make another bargain with some one
else or somehow; or in some way arrange so that I shall be enabled
to set the one transaction off against the other, and neither have to
deliver nor receive actual stock or the price of it."
I am not sure whether that was the bargain between the principal and broker; but most"certainly it is not the bargain if you take
an isolated case.
If I went to a broker and said, "I wish you would sell for me
10,000 consuls for the next account," and he did so, I clearly am
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of opinion that I should have no right to go to him afterwards and
say, in the sense of his being bound to do it, "you must rebuy
them for me; for he could say, "I am not bound to do so."
Whether such an obligation or duty arises on the part of the
broker in cases where there has been a continal mode of so transacting business may be more doubtful. If it could be proved that
the principal had said, "I cannot take these things in reality, and
so you must resell them," and the broker had said, "of course," or if
he had used an expression to the effect that he would rather not do
it, but had done it, it might be that a jury would find that the
understanding between the parties was not that that state of things
should go on ad infinitum, but that there was at least this arrangement between the broker and the principal, viz.: that every trans-,
action for one account should be disposed of quoad that account,
by a transaction in a contrary sense, so that only the difference
between the two should be paid. It is possible that one might conclude, under such circumstances, that the principal would have a
right to say, "you made bargains for me by which I must deliver;
you must undo those bargains by selling, so that I receive; the
result will be that you can set off the two transactions, and I shall
only have to pay you, or receive from you, the difference." That,
however, is subject to this limitation, that the broker might say,
"I am not bound to do it; I will try to do it if there is a market."
Whether or not I should come to that conclusion in the present
case would require me to have a more minute knowledge of the
facts than I have; but I will suppose, in favor of Mr. Mackenzie
that that was the bargain between the two parties, and that the
principal would have a right to say to the broker, "The transaction you entered into is for a purchase, and accordingly I am
bound to receive the stock and pay for it; but I call upon you by
virtue of the bargain you and I made when I employed you, to
sell that stock for me, so that, instead of my taking and paying for
it, I shall only have to take or pay the difference." In my opinion
there is nothing in that transaction within the Gaming and Wagering Act, for it is quite clear that even in a bargain like that the
principal would have a right to say, "I will not go on with these
speculations, lut I will take the article purchased and hold it as an
investment." I have no doubt that that does continually happen,
and that men who have bought with the hiope of a rise, intending
to sell again (not to any enormous extent, but men who have bought
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for speculative purposes), have been met with a fall, and have been
so disgusted at having to end the matter by reselling or continuing
it on and paying continuations or backwardations, as the case might
be, that they have under such circumstances found the money and
taken the stock and paid for it; and so in that case the transaction
comes to this, that the- principal has a right to say, "Well, I will
tak the stock I have bought (if it was a purchase), or deliver the

stock I have sold," (if it was a sale) ; or a ight to say, "You
must try to end the transaction by buying or selling again." I
say "try," for the broker might be unable to do so, and all he
would be bound to do would be to endeavor to buy or sell again.
What is there illegal in that? I employ you to buy with a right
to call on you to sell if it does not suit me to take the article;
what gambling or wagering is there between a broker or jobber in
that case? Absolutely none. The broker can say it does not matter to me if the thing goes up or down; but in a case of wagering
as to the price of stock it does matter to him. In GrzewooaZ v.
.Blane, it mattered to bath parties if the thing went up or down,
but in the case I put that is not so, and there is no wager or
gaming at all. The gamester in heart would be the principal, but
thd broker would not be wagering or gaming at all. I am of opinion, therefore, even- if everything were, found in
Mr. fackenzie's favor, which he has suggested should be found,
that this case would not be within the Gaming and Wagering Act.
I will not, under the circumstances, say anything more about
riizewood v. .Blane. The difference is that there the question
was not between the broker and the principal, but between two
principals-a jobber in the house, and a principal out of the house
-and the case has no bearing on the present one.
Now, as to time bargains. Mr. Justice LINDLEY has shown what
he unaerstood to be &time bargain and an invalid one. A time
bargain, merely because it is one, is not invalid. If a man were
to undertake to sell me a crop of apples for next year, that is not
invalid. But when, by a time bargain, you understand something
different in reality from what it purports to be, and that, whereas
it purports to be an agreement to deliver and sell an article on a
particular day, it is really no such agreement, but is an agreement
to pay what shall be the difference between the price when the
bargain was made and the price at the future time they name; such
VOL. XXVII.-33
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an arrangement is something in the nature of a wager or gaming
on the question of what would be the price.
On these grounds I am of opinion that this judgment must be
affirmed.
It may be a shocking thing that there should be gaming on the
stock exchange, but that is not the question we have to consider:
and I am not sure that some place where people could speculate,
and buy and sell, not with a view so much to making an investment
as to making a profit, is not for the public benefit, for it is a certainty that by it markets can be found for persons who are so
minded, and I believe that we are indebted to it for a great many
of the railways and useful undertakings that we now have.
Appeal dismissed.
BRETT

and Com'om, L.JJ., delivered concurring opinions.

I Ever since the days of Ilibblewhite v.
McMorine, it has generally been held
that a contract for the sale and future
delivery of personal property is notvoid"
at common law, merely because the
seller did not then own the same, proTided he had a bona fide intention of
obtaining it by purchase, manufacture
or otherwise, before the de.y of promised
delivery. See Stanton v. Emall, 3 Sandf.
230 (1849); Cassard v. Hinman, 1
Bosw. 207 (1857); Porter v. Viets, 1
Biss. 177; Logan v. Musicc, 81 Ill.
415 (1877) ; Wolcott v. Heath, 78 Ill.
433 (1875) ; Clarke v. Fcss, 7 Biss. 540
(1878), a valuable case on this point.
Nor are such contracts void at common law merely because it is therein
made optional in either party to fulfil
it or not as he chooses. If a seller is
willing to absolutely bind himself to
sell and deliver at a certain price, and
allow the buyer to take it or not at his
option, there is no illegality in the contract. Whether it would be binding
without some other consideration than
such a promise to take is another question.
And apparently a consideration is usually

advanced by the party who has the privilege by the contract. But aside from the
question of consideration, optional contracts---in which one may be bound and
the other not,-are of course not illegal
at common law; Giles v. Bradley, 2
Johns. Cas. 253 (1801) ; Disborough v.
eison, 3 Johns. Cas. 81 (1802); Pzzley
v. Boynton, 79 Ill. 351 (1875) ; Bigelow
v. Benedict, 70 N. Y. 202 (1877).
Optional contracts are sometimes forlidden by statute. Such is the case in
Illinois and probably. elsewhere : Rev.
Stat. c. 38, sect. 130. But optional
contracts in which the only option reserved is, on what particularday, within a
given time, the seller shall deliver, are
not contrary to the statute of Illinois :
Plxley v. Boynton, 79 Ill. 351 ; Gilbert
v. Gaugar, 10 Ch. Leg. News, p. 340
(1877).
All optional contracts, therefore, are
not per se illegal. A bargain for an
option may be legitimate and for a
proper business object. But as such
agreements can be readily prostituted
to the worst kind of gambling ventures,
their character may be weighed by a

I Our readers will find a note upon the same subject, ante, p. 229, the two having been simultaneously prepared without knowledge of each other.
I ED. A. L. R.
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jury in considering whether the bargain was a mere scheme to gamble
upon the chance of prices. The form
of the venture, aided by other evidence,
may clearly indicate a purpose to wager
upon the rise or fall in the price of an
article, at some future day, and not to
deal in the article as men usually do in
that business. But gambling is not to
be confounded with honest speculation.
Therefore it was held in Kirkpatrick v.
Bonsal, 72 Penn. St. 155 (1872), that
the court could not say that on itsface,
such a contract as the following was
illegal :
"Nov. 10th 1870. In consideration
of $1000, we agree to deliver B., should
he call for it, during the first six months
of 1871, 5000 barrels of oil. If said
oil is called for, this call becomes a contract; ten days' notice shall be given,
and B. agrees to receive and pay for the
same cost on delivery, at 10 cents a
gallon." And a similar view was taken
of an optional contract for gold, in
Bigelowv. Benedict,70N.Y. 204 (1877).
See also, Barry v. Crosky, 2 Johns. &
Hem. 2 (1861).
It is real intention of the parties,
which makes such contracts valid or invalid, and it has been thought that such
unlawful intention must have been mutual, in order to make the contract void.
A secret intention of one party not to
fulfil his contract unknown to the other
would not have that effect : Clarke v.
Foss, 7 Biss. 540 (1878).
And the
intention of the parties in making such
contracts, is one of fact for the jury,
to be determined if need be by extrinsic
evidence ; and the" admission of such
evidence does not violate the rule that
parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary a written agreement:
Cassardv.Hinman, 1 Bosw. 207 (1857).
And see rn re Morgan, 2 DeGex, F. &
3.634(1860). Andof course the party
himself, if a witness, may be asked what
his real intention was : Yerkes v. Salomnon, 18 Han 471 (1877).

Selling an article "short,'! is not
therefore, ipsofacto, a wager and illegal.
It may be evidence of a wager, but there
must be other facts to characterize the
transaction, and to show that the actual
intention of the parties was to wager
merely upon the prospective price: Marton v. Gheen, 75 Penn. St. 168 (1874)
Smith v. Bouvier, 70 Id. 325 (1872) ,
Appleman v. Ysher, 34 51d. 540 (1871).
These optional contracts are often
styled, "puts" and "calls." A "put,"
in commercial language, is a contract
in which the seller retains the privilege
of delivering or not delivering the subject-matter of the sale at his option;
and a "call" is one which in the buyer
has the privilege of calling or not calling for it at the time named.
The law in regard to such contracts
was carefully examined in Chandler's
Case, 13 Am. Law Rep. N. S. 310
(1874).
There Chandler of Chicago,
seeking to make a corner in oats for
June 1872, purchased all the "cash
oats," and took all the "options "offered him for June delivery, his object being to put all the oats in market, and
compel those who had sold "options "
for June to pay his price, or settle with
him by paying the difference between
the prices he paid for the options, and
the price he should establish in June.
He purchased about 2,500,000 bushels for
cash, and bought June options for about
3,000,000 more. The total amount ofoats
in Chicago during the whole month of
June was only about 3,500,000 bushels.
As part of the arrangement for creating a
comer, Chandler also sold what are
called "puts," or privileges of delivering him oats during the month of June,
for 41 cents a bushel, for which the
other party paid J cent a bushel for the
quantity named in the contract, which
read thus: "Received of A. B. $50, in
consideration of which, we give him
the privilege of delivering to us. or not,
prior to 3 o'clock P. x. of June 30th
1872, 10,000 bushels oats, at 41 cents a

THACKER v. HARDY.
bushel ; .and if delivered, we agree to
receive and pay for the same at the
above rate." The total quantity contracted for by these "puts" was about
3,700,000 bushels, and for which Chandler received at the rate of j ceut a bushel,
about $18,500. Before the last day of
June, oats declined about 26 cents a
bushel, and the holders of the puts
claimed of Chandler the difference between the market price of the oats and
41 cents a bushel, which Chandler had
agreed to pay, or about $400,000.
Chandler failed and went into bankruptcy, and the creditors sought to prove the
amount of their loss against his estate;
which BLODGETT, J., disallowed, on
the ground not only that the transaction
was a wager, and contrary to the statute
of Illinois, but also void at common law,
as contrary to public policy. The opinion ofJudge BLODGETT well deserves perusal. See also Ex parte Young, 6 Bissell 56, (1874) ; in re Green, 7 Bissell
338 (1877).
In Brua's Appeal, 55 Penn. St. 294
(1867), it was held that a contract to
purchase stocks without the intention to
deliver or receive them, is a gaming contract and void. And this was directly
affirmed in Swartz's Appeal, 3 Brewst.
131 (1869). In Pickering v. Cease, 79
Ill. 327 (1875), it was held that a contract for the sale and future delivery of
grain, by which the seller has the privilege of delivering or not delivering, and
the buyer that of calling or not calling
for the grain, as each may choose, and
which on maturity is to be fulfilled by
adjusting the differences in the market
value, is an "optional contract," and in
the nature of gambling transactions, and
void even at common law, as well as under the statute of Illinois.
So in Lyon v. Culbertson, 83 Ill. 34
(1876), it was held that it contract for
the sale of grain in store, to be delivered at a future time, with a provision that
the parties shall put up margins as security, and that if either party fails, a
notice to put up further margins, accord-

ing to the market price, the other may
treat the contract as filled at the then
market value, and recover the difference
between such market price and the contract price, and without any offer to perform on his part, or showing an ability
to perform, is illegal.
In Rudolph v. Winters, 7 Neb. 126
(1878), the defendant deposited money in
the plaintiff's hands, to be invested in
grain options in Chicago, in which venture each party was to receive a proportion of the profits and bear the losses, and
the loss largely exceeded the amount invested by both parties, which losses the
plaintiff paid and charged the defendant. He was not allowed to recover.
See also Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass.
145 (1869).
Thus far the question of the validity
of the contract seems to have arisen
between the parties to it, and not between one party and his broker whom
he had employed to negotiate the contract, as in Tacker v. Hardy, supra.
Whether an agent may recover of his
principal, may depend upon two considations: 1st, upon the language of the
statute, if there be one, which prohibits
such contract; and 2d, upon the guilty
participation of the broker or agent in
aiding the party to violate the statute.
If a statute merely declares a contract void, but does not clearly make it
illegal, an agent or broker who advances
his funds or services to his principal to
enable him to make or fulfil a merely
void contract, is not precluded from recovering. Some contracts are void under
the Statute of Frauds, but not "1illegal ;"
and any person who lends money to
enable a party to fulfil a contract void
under that statute, would be surprised to
hear he could.not recover it back of the
borrower ; and of course he could: Pawle
v. Gunn, 4 Bing. N. C. 445.
But if the contract be made "illegal"
by the statute, an agent who knowingly
contributes by money or services to enable his principal to violate the law can
not recover. It is for this reason that
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one who lends a friend money to gamble with, knowing the purpose, cannot
recover the loan: McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434; White v. Buss, 3
Cash. 448; because by statute, that gambling contract was illegal and not merely
void. So if a stock-jobbing act makes
contracts in stocks not then owned illegal, one who knowingly lends money to
enable one to pay up his losses by such
a contract, cannot recover it: Carnan v.
Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 19. And see De
Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 105.
But as the stock-jobbing act under
which Cannan v. Bryce, was decided, is
repealed in England by stat. 23 Viet.
. 28, such contracts are now simply
", void," under 8 & 9 Viet. c. 109, and of
course a different decision might now
be made on the same state of facts.
But as the statute of 8 & 9 Vict. c.
109, on which 2i7acLer v. Hardy, was
decided, merely makes a wagering contract in stocks "void," but not illegal,
it has frequently been held that a person who helps another to fulfil such a
void contract by loaning him money, or
paying the amount due to the other
party, may recover it back of the party
for whom and at whose request he advanced it. See Knight v. Cambers, 15
C. B. 562; Ouds v. Harrison, 10 Exch.
572; Rosewarne v. Billing, 15 C. B. N.
S. 316 ; Jessoppv. Lutwyche, 10Ex. 614.
Several American decisions are in harmony with the decision of Thacker v.
Hardy; holding that when a broker has
made contracts for the future sale or
delivery, on the order of his principal,
he may recover for his fees and disbursements, notwithstanding the principal did
not intend to either take or deliver according to the broker's contract, but
merely "to settle the differences," at the
maturity of the contract ; and especially
when it did not clearly appear that the
broker was aware of such intention. The
most notable, perhaps, in support of this
view are Lehman Brothersv. Strassberger,
2 Woods 554 (1873); Gilbertv. Graugar,

10 Ch. Leg. News 340 (1877); C7arke
v. Foss, 7 Bissell 540 (1878).
In R msey v. Berry, 65 Me. 570, the
defendant, having no wheat to sell, employed the plaintiff, a broker, to sell
10,000 bushels at $1.30 per bushel, to
be delivered anytime during May 1872,
and deposited $700 as a 1. margin," to secure the plaintiff against loss in the rise
of wheat; and the plaintiff as agent for
the defendant, made contracts to sell
accordingly. Wheat rose above $1.30,
and the plaintiff was obliged to settle
with his customers at a loss of about
$3000. He was allowed to recover of
the defendant, the balance of this, above
his $700 margin, although he knew the
defendant did not own any wheat when
he made the bargain with him. Three
judges dissented, one did not sit, and
four concurred in the decision. This
difference of opinion may perhaps have,
been in part owing to the reason that
the facts had not been distinctly determined by the jury, as.they should have
been, and so no clearly defined question
of law was presented to the court.
A different view seems to have been
taken in Pennsylvania . Farrirav. Gabell, 4 Weekly Notes 572 (1877). So
in Green's case, 7 Bissell 338, it was
held that a broker, or agent of the buyer
who makes the bargain and pays the
"differences " to the seller, knowing
the character of the transaction, cannot
recover of his principal the amount so
paid. And see Tenney v. Foote, 11 Ch.
Leg. News 71 (1878). But these may
have proceeded on the ground that
such speculating contracts in gold or
grain, are not only void, but "illegal,"
either at common law, or by force of
some local statute, and that the plaintiff could not make out his own case,
without showing the illegal coutract between the defendant and the third party;
and upon that state of facts, the decisions
would be in harmony with the wellsettled principles of law.
EDMUND H. BzExETT.

